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Various authors, most notably Putnam (2000), have argued that low-density living reduces
social capital and thus social interaction, and this argument has been used to buttress criticisms
of urban sprawl. If low densities in fact reduce social interaction, then an externality arises,
validating Putnam’s critique. In choosing their own lot sizes, consumers would fail to consider
the loss of interaction beneﬁts for their neighbors when lot size is increased. Lot sizes would
then be ineﬃciently large, and cities excessively spread out. The paper tests the premise of
this argument (the existence of a positive link between interaction and density) using data
from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. In the empirical work, social interaction measures
for individual survey respondents are regressed on census-tract density and a host of household
characteristics, using an instrumental-variable approach to control for the potential endogeneity
of density.Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Ann G. Largey
1. Introduction
Urban sprawl has become a hot policy issue in the United States over the last decade.
Critics of sprawl argue that urban expansion leads to an undesirable sacriﬁce of farmland along
with a loss of amenity beneﬁts from open space on the urban fringe. The longer commutes
caused by sprawl are thought to create excessive traﬃc congestion and air pollution, and
sprawl’s suburban focus is viewed as depressing the incentive to revitalize decaying downtown
areas. Finally, commentators such as Putnam (2000) argue that the low-density suburban
lifestyle associated with sprawl reduces social capital, leading to a less-healthy society.1
In response to these concerns, local governments have adopted a wide range of antisprawl
measures, including urban growth boundaries (UGBs) and other related zoning policies, public
land-purchase programs designed to protect vacant land, and price-based mechanisms such as
impact fees that are designed to slow the pace of development. See Brueckner (2001) for an
overview of such policies; Nechyba and Walsh (2005) and Glaeser and Kahn (2006) oﬀer further
discussion.
In appraising the attack on sprawl, Brueckner (2000, 2001) argues that criticism of urban
spatial expansion is only justiﬁed in the presence of market failures or other distortions, which
bias the normal expansionary eﬀects of population and income growth in an upward direction.
Such distortions might include a failure by developers to account for the amenity value of
fringe open space in their development decisions, and the failure of commuters to account for
the congestion externalities they generate. The ﬁrst failure leads to excessive conversion of
agricultural land, while the second leads to overly long commute trips, and both eﬀects imply
excessive spatial expansion of cities. The remedy for the ﬁrst failure would be higher tax on
urban development, designed to charge the developer for lost open-space amenities, and the
remedy for the second would be congestion pricing of roadways.2
1The purpose of the present paper is to consider a diﬀerent market failure, one associated
with social interaction, and to assess whether this failure is empirically relevant as a basis
for criticism of urban sprawl. The starting point of the analysis is the above allegation that
sprawling, low-density development weakens social capital and thus the level of social interac-
tion. While such an eﬀect, by itself, is not the basis of a proper anti-sprawl argument, the case
is diﬀerent if the nexus between social interaction and density involves an externality.
To understand the argument, suppose that people value social interaction,3 and that the
extent of interaction in a neighborhood is an increasing function of the area’s average popula-
tion density. By putting people in close proximity, high average density could plausibly spur
interaction among them. Average density in a particular household’s neighborhood depends,
in turn, on its own consumption of living space as well as the space consumption levels of its
neighbors.
In choosing space consumption, a household would consider the direct gains from having
more room, along with the negative eﬀect on the social interaction it enjoys, caused by the drop
in neighborhood population density due to its larger residence. But the household would fail to
consider the external eﬀects of consuming more space, which consist of less social interaction
for all its neighbors, again a consequence of lower neighborhood density. The result is a density
externality, which makes space consumption ineﬃcientlyhigh for each household, an eﬀect that
translates into an ineﬃciently low level of population density for the neighborhood. Because
this argument can be replicated city-wide, it implies ineﬃciently low density throughout the
urban area, and thus ineﬃcient spatial expansion of the entire city. Thus, the existence of a
density externality based on social interaction can provide another basis for criticism of urban
sprawl.4
A simple model developing this idea is presented in section 2. But the main goal of
the paper is to appraise the empirical relevance of an anti-sprawl argument based on social
interaction. This task requiresan empiricaltest of the underlyinghypothesis, which asserts that
social interaction is an increasing function of population density. If this hypothesis is validated,
then the existence of a density externality follows naturally, leading to the conclusion that the
spatial expansion of cities is excessive.
2The paper uses data from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, which provides a number of
diﬀerent measures of social interaction for individual survey respondents in a national sample,
while identifying the census tract where each respondent lives. With the tract identity known,
population density can be computed for each survey respondent’s “neighborhood.” This density
measure is then used as a right-hand variable in a regression explaining social interaction,
which also includes a variety of demographic indicators as covariates. The social interaction
measures that are used include a count of the respondent’s number of close friends, an indicator
of whether the respondent has someone to “conﬁde in,” and related variables.
Similar exercises have been carried out by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) and Borck (2006),
focusing more broadly on the determinants of social capital, which includes political involve-
ment and civic engagement in addition to measures of social interaction. Glaeser and Gottlieb
relate their social capital indicators to suburban vs. city residence, and Borck investigates how
social capital is aﬀected by city size.
In addition to its narrower focus, the present paper diﬀers from both these studies by
measuring the key determinant of interaction (here, density) at a disaggregated, census-tract
level. This approach raises an econometric issue that was not a major factor in the previous
studies. In particular, with the census tract of residence being a choice variable of the sur-
vey respondent, it cannot be treated as an exogenous determinant of social interaction. For
example, if social interaction indeed rises with density, then an unusually interactive person
(one with unobservable characteristics highly favorable to interaction) might select a dense
census tract in seeking a congenial place of residence. With this behavior, density would be
positively correlated with the error term in a social-interaction regression, leading to a biased
and inconsistent estimate of its coeﬃcient. Such correlation could also be generated by other
kinds of location behavior.
The empirical work uses an instrumental-variables approach to handle this endogeneity
problem. Since none of the demographic variables available in the survey can be plausibly ex-
cluded as a determinant of interaction, diﬀerent instruments were sought. The chosen variables
are measures of population density at a more-aggregated level: the ﬁrst is population density
for the urbanized area containing the census tract, and the second is density for the tract’s
3MSA. These average density measures are strong determinants of population densities in in-
dividual census tracts. Their use, however, presumes that the endogeneity problem involving
tract density does not extend to the metro level. In other words, while people may self-select
across tracts in endogenous fashion, their choice of a metro area (and hence metro density) is
presumed to be unrelated to unobservable characteristics aﬀecting social interaction.5
Following the theoretical discussion in the next section, the data and variables are described
in section 3, and empirical ﬁndings are presented in section 4. Section 5 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Modeling the Density Externality
A density externality can be modeled in the context of a monocentric city, as seen in Fujita
(1989, Ch. 7). However, a simpler spatial structure comes from assuming that individual land
parcels are arbitrarily clustered together in space without the attractive force of a central
business district. For further simpliﬁcation, suppose that people consume land directly, with
housing capital suppressed, and let consumer i’s land consumption (lot size) be denoted qi.
The spatial area of the city, denoted A, is then found by adding the individual lot sizes, so
that A =
n
j=1 qj,w h e r en is the number of consumers.
In addition to lot size, consumer i cares about non-land consumption expenditure, denoted
ci, and social interaction, denoted Ii. Preferences, assumed for simplicity to be the same for
all consumers, are given by the well-behaved utility function U(qi,c i,I i). For simplicity, the
level of social interaction is also assumed to be uniform, and it depends on the city’s average
population density, which equals n/A. While under a more realistic approach, Ii might depend
only on the average densities of the lots near i’s, this change would only introduce inessential
complications in the model. As seen below, however, this local approach to measurement of
density is followed in the empirical work.
Given the above assumptions, the level of interaction can be written Ii = f(n/A), with
f being a smoothly increasing function under a positive density eﬀect (so that f  > 0).6
For completeness, however, it is helpful to also consider the possibility that a higher density
reduces interaction, as assumed by Fujita (1989).7 In this case, f(·) is a decreasing function,
with f  < 0.
4Land is assumed to be available at a ﬁxed opportunity cost r,s ot h a tc o n s u m e ri’s budget
constraint is ci+rqi = y,w h e r ey is the common level of income. Eliminating ci, the objective
function for consumer i is then given by
U
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The consumer chooses qi to maximize (1), taking the lot sizes of other consumers, qk, k  = i,
as parametric. The ﬁrst-order condition is
−rUc + Uq − UI nf 
(

qj)2 =0 , (2)
where superscripts denote partial derivatives. Since consumers are identical, the resulting Nash
equilibrium is symmetric, with

qj = nq,w h e r eq is the common lot size. Rearranging and
imposing symmetry, (2) becomes
Uq





If the density eﬀect is positive, this condition says that lot size is optimal when the consumption
beneﬁt from a marginal increase in q, given by the MRS term on the left, is equal to the money
cost per unit of land, r, plus a cost from reduced interaction, as captured by the last term.
This cost is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of interaction (the MRS term) times the reduction
in the interaction enjoyed by the consumer when his lot size increases (the f /nq2 term).
Because consumers ignore the density externality, the equilibrium characterized by (3)
is ineﬃcient. The social optimum can be found by imposing symmetry at the outset and
maximizing the utility of a representative consumer. The objective function is then U[y −
r q ,q ,f (1/q)], where density is given by n/nq =1 /q. The ﬁrst-order condition for this
problem is
Uq





5where f /q2 gives the loss of interaction when lot size is increased simultaneously for all con-
sumers. Since the 1/n factor in the last term of (3) is smaller than unity, it follows that the
interaction-cost term in (4) is larger than the corresponding term in (3). As a result, the MRS
on the left-hand side is larger at the social optimum than at the Nash equilibrium, which will
tend to make the socially optimal lot size, denoted q∗, smaller than the equilibrium size, de-
noted qe. This conclusion is assured, for example, if preferences are additively separable in I,
so that the MRS term on the left of (3) and (4) is independent of the level of social interaction.
Since qe >q ∗, it follows the equilibrium spatial size of the city, denoted Ae ≡ nqe, is larger
than the optimal size, A∗ ≡ nq∗. Thus, the equilibrium is characterized by ineﬃcient spatial
expansion of the urban area, providing a basis for criticism of urban sprawl.
The social optimum can be supported by a tax per unit of land consumption, denoted t,
which would appear as an extra term on the RHS of the equilibrium condition (3). This tax
must make (3)’s RHS equal to the RHS of (4), evaluated at the optimum. Equating the two
expressions, the tax is given by
t =




where the asterisks on f and the marginal utilities indicate that these expressions are evaluated
at the social optimum. Recalling from above that the expression in (5), absent the n−1 factor,
gives one consumer’s loss from lower interaction when his lot size increases, it follows that the
tax serves to charge the consumer for the equivalent losses suﬀered by his n − 1n e i g h b o r s .
With the externality thus internalized, the equilibrium under taxation is eﬃcient.
By contrast, if the density eﬀect is negative, with f  < 0, then the second term in (4) is
negative, and qe <q ∗. Individual lot sizesare thus too small, and the cityis insuﬃcientlyspread
out rather than too large. In this case, t in (5) is negative, indicating that land consumption
should be subsidized, not taxed, to support the social optimum.
When the density eﬀect is positive, an urban growth boundary can be used to generate
the optimum. An upper bound of A∗ would be imposed on the spatial size of the city via
zoning regulations, and this restriction in land supply would cause the land price to rise above
6its opportunity cost. The new equilibrium would be characterized by (3), with r replaced by
an endogenous land rent r, along with the condition

qj = A∗. It is easy to see that the
equalities q = q∗ and r = r + t hold in equilibrium.
By contrast, a diﬀerent type of quantity restriction is needed to address the ineﬃciency
caused by a negative density eﬀect. In this case, a minimum-lot-size regulation, which requires
q ≥ q∗,m u s tb ei m p o s e d .
The preceding analysis shows that, if social interaction is an increasing function of pop-
ulation density, then the uncoordinated choices of consumers will lead to lot sizes that are
ineﬃciently large and a city that takes up too much space. The remainder of the paper is de-
voted to testing the premise of this argument, namely, that interaction increases with density.
3. Data and Variables
The data are drawn from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, which was carried out
by the Saguaro Seminar at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and is disseminated by
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut (www.roper.
uconn.edu). The survey posed hundreds of social-capital questions to a nationwide sample of
over 30,000 respondents. A restricted version of the data identiﬁes each respondent’s census
tract, allowing accurate measurement of local population density. Given the focus on urban
sprawl, attention is restricted to those respondents living in the urbanized-area portions of
MSAs (thus excluding rural areas), which reduces the sample size to 14,827 individuals. Be-
cause most of the social interaction variables, which are described next, have a small number
of missing values, the eﬀective sample sizes are usually slightly smaller than this number.
The analysis focuses on variables narrowly measuring social interaction, not including
broader indicators of social capital. The variables, whose full deﬁnitions are given in Table 1
along with summary statistics, fall into two sets. The ﬁrst set consists of variables measuring
the extent of the respondent’s neighborhood contacts and friendships. NEISOC measures
how often the respondent socializes with neighbors; NEITALK is a dummy variable indicating
whether this interaction occurs at least once a week; CONFIDE counts the number of people
the respondent can conﬁde in; FRIENDS counts the number of close friends; FRNDHNG
7measures the frequency of “hanging out” with friends in a public place; FRNDHOM measures
the frequency with which friends are invited to the respondent’s home.
The second set of variables measures the respondent’s group involvement. NEICOOP is a
dummy indicating cooperation with neighbors to get something ﬁxed or improved; GRPHOB is
a dummy indicating membership in a hobby-oriented club; CCLUBMET counts the frequency
of attendance at any club meetings over the previous twelve months; GRPINVLV counts the
number of formal non-church groups to which the member belongs.
The various social-interaction measures are used as dependent variables in separate regres-
sions. In addition to tract-level population density, which is measured in log form and denoted
LNPDEN TRACT, many demographic covariates are used in these regressions. While full
details and variable names are listed in Table 1, these variables include the measures of the
respondent’s sex, age, race, income, education, region of residence, and marital, employment
and citizenship status. Other variables capture the presence of children in the household and
whether the respondent has lived in the area for more than 5 years. While the eﬀects of many
of these variables on social interaction are hard to predict a priori, marriage (or living with
a partner) might lead to more interaction given that couples can beneﬁt from one another’s
acquaintances. In addition, since many adult social bonds are made through child-related ac-
tivities, the presence of children should raise the level of interaction. Since long-time residents
have had more opportunity to build social linkages, they should exhibit higher interaction
than recent arrivals. Lacking social connections at work, unemployed respondents would be
expected to interact less than their employed counterparts. Since non-citizens may not be well
integrated into U.S. society, they may engage in less social interaction than citizens.
It could be argued that marital status (and thus ultimately the presence of children)
depends on the interactive tendencies of an individual, with weak interactors less likely to
become married. This view suggests that MAR PART and the two KIDS variables could
be viewed as endogenous, making them inappropriate as right-hand variables in an equation
explaining interaction. To address this possibility, speciﬁcations without these variables are
also estimated, with the results reported following presentation of the main estimates. The
HOMEMAKER variable is also dropped in these equations.
8As indicated above, the instruments for tract population density are the log of average
density for the urbanized area containing the tract (LNPDEN UA), and the log of average
density for the tract’s MSA (LNPDEN MSA). While urbanized-area density may be most
relevant as a determinant of the densities of individual census tracts, all of which are in urban-
ized areas, MSA density provides additional information. In particular, holding LNPDEN UA
ﬁxed, MSA density helps to capture population densities in the rural portions of an MSA, out-
side its urbanized areas. This role can be seen in Table 1, which reveals that MSA density
has a lower sample mean than urbanized-area density, reﬂecting the rural component. Rural
density, in turn, is a good predictor of the minimum density in the urbanized area, which is
achieved at the urban fringe. Thus, information on rural density (via LNPDEN MSA) and
average density for the urbanized-area pins down two points on the area’s spatial distribution
of population densities. As a result, use of both variables as instruments seems warranted. For
comparison purposes, however, the results from a model that uses LNPDEN UA by itself as
an instrument are also discussed following presentation of the main results. The number of
urbanized areas represented in the sample is 308, and only a few of these areas belonged to a
common MSA.
When the social interaction measure is a binary variable, the equation is estimated using
the maximum-likelihood version of Stata’s IVPROBIT routine. This routine jointly estimates
a probit regression and a linear equation determining LPDEN TRACT. For the continuous
dependent variables, the equations are estimated via two-stage least squares. In presenting the




The results of the ﬁrst-stage regression used in the 2SLS estimations are shown in Table
2.8 Because the key population density covariates are constant within urbanized areas, the
coeﬃcient standard errors in the regression are adjusted using a cluster correction. The results
show that average urbanized-area and MSA population densities are both signiﬁcant deter-
9minants of individual tract densities, suggesting that use of both variables as instruments is
appropriate. The coeﬃcients are both less than one, indicating that tract densities respond
only partially to an increase in the level of aggregate density. Note also that the urbanized-area
density coeﬃcient is larger, showing a stronger tract density response to the more-localized
aggregate measure.
The results also show that tract density is monotonically decreasing in household income,
with the income-class coeﬃcients becoming increasingly negative as the class rises. These re-
sults conﬁrm the well-known tendency of higher-income households to seek suburban locations.
Households containing married couples and those with children also live in less-dense tracts,
and other things equal, households with older heads follow the same pattern. But a higher
education level for the survey respondent has the opposite eﬀect, pulling the household toward
denser census tracts. Unemployed respondents live in dense tracts, while U.S. citizens show
the opposite pattern. Finally, Black, Hispanic and Asian respondents tend to reside in denser
census tracts than non-minority households.
4.2. Results for friendship-oriented variables
Results for the friendship-oriented social-interaction variables are presented in Table 3.
Panel A of the table shows 2SLS results with NEISOC, a continuous measure, as the depen-
dent variable. Notably, the table shows that the coeﬃcient on tract density is negative and
signiﬁcant, indicating that the frequency of interaction with neighbors is lower in high-density
census tracts. This ﬁnding contradicts the main hypothesis, which says that such interaction
should increase with tract density.
The signs of some of other estimated coeﬃcients match the expectations discussed above.
Interaction with neighbors is more frequent when the respondent is married (or living in a
partnership), when children are present, and when the respondent is a citizen. The coeﬃ-
cient of LIVG5, while positive, is not signiﬁcant, indicating no eﬀect of long-time residence
in a neighborhood. Unemployed status also has no eﬀect, but being retired increases the re-
spondent’s interaction with neighbors. Among variables whose eﬀects were hard to predict,
increases in age, income, and education lead to more frequent interaction, while Black and
Hispanic households show less interaction than non-minority respondents. The regional coeﬃ-
10cients show that, relative to the omitted Paciﬁc region, interaction with neighbors is stronger
in the west-central part of the country, which corresponds to the Plains states. Finally, the test
for endogeneity of the tract density measure suggest that this variable is indeed endogenous,
and the overidentiﬁcation J-test shows that the instruments are valid.
Panel B of Table 3 shows IVPROBIT results using the binary NEITALK measure as
dependent variable. This variable, which indicates that the respondent interacts with neighbors
at least once a week, is a less-precise measure than NEISOC. Apparently because of this
diﬀerence, the tract-density coeﬃcient, while still negative, is now insigniﬁcant. The signs and
signiﬁcance of the remaining coeﬃcients mostly follow the pattern in panel A, except that none
of the income coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. The Wald test rejects exogeneity of tract-density.9
Panel C of the table shows 2SLS results when CONFIDE is the dependent variable. The
tract-density coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that respondents living in dense
census tracts have fewer conﬁdants. Once again, this result contradicts the hypothesis of
stronger interaction in denser areas. While the eﬀects of income, education, minority status,
retirement, and citizenship match those in the NEISOC equation, marriage and children now
have signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients. Apparently, marriage and children increase superﬁcial
contacts with neighbors, but reduce the formation of strong outside bonds by fostering an
inward orientation. While panel A showed that older respondents interact more with their
neighbors, panel C shows they have fewer conﬁdants up to the quadratic minimum of 51
years, beyond which the age eﬀect turns positive. Also, residence outside of the Paciﬁc region
mostly reduces the number of conﬁdants, in contrast to the ﬁndings for neighbor interaction.
Finally, male respondents have fewer conﬁdants than do females, and unemployment now has
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect. While the endogeneity test now cannot reject exogeneity of tract
density, the overidentiﬁcation J-test nevertheless indicates validity of the instruments.
Panel D shows 2SLS results when FRIENDS is the dependent variable. The tract-density
coeﬃcient is again negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that higher tract density reduces the
number of friends, which again contradicts the main hypothesis. The eﬀects of age, marriage,
children, income, education, minority status, retirement, and unemployment match those in
panel C, but the sex eﬀect is now reversed, with males having more friends than females.10
11Long-time neighborhood residence shows its ﬁrst signiﬁcant impact, raising the number of
friends. The non-Paciﬁc regional coeﬃcients are mostly negative, but residence in the west-
north-central regional raises the number of friends. Both diagnostic tests are satisfactory.
Panel E shows 2SLS results when FRNDHNG is the dependent variable. The tract-density
coeﬃcient, while negative, is now insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects of age, marriage, children, income,
education, minority status, retirement, and long-time neighborhood residence match those
in panel D, but the male coeﬃcient is now signiﬁcantly negative.11 Evidently, while male
respondents have more friends, they spend less time hanging out with them in public places
than do females. Regional impacts are again mixed, but the eﬀect of unemploymentis no longer
signiﬁcant. Exogeneity of tract densityis rejected, but the J-test now rejects the overidentifying
restrictions. Therefore, there are grounds for questioning the suitability of the instruments for
this equation, despite their good performance in the other regressions.
Panel F of Table 3 shows 2SLS results when FRNDHOM is the dependent variable. The
tract-density coeﬃcient is again negative but now signiﬁcant, indicating that respondents invite
friends to their homes less frequently in denser census tracts. The other results mostly match
those in panel E, except that the male coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant.12 The diagnostic tests show
the same pattern as in panel E.
Table 3 also shows the tract-density coeﬃcients when the various equations are estimated
without instrumental variables, using either OLS or regular probit. As can be seen, the density
coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in the non-IV case in the NEISOC, CONFIDE, FRIENDS, FRND-
HOM equations, becoming signiﬁcantly negative when IV estimation is used. By contrast, the
non-IV coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive in the NEITALK and FRNDHNG equations, while
IV estimation leads to coeﬃcients that are negative and insigniﬁcant. These comparison sug-
gest that, for each equation, IV methods eliminate an upward bias in the non-IV estimates.
This conclusion, in turn, suggests that tract density is positively correlated with the error term
in each equation, indicating that individuals whose unobservable attributes favor interaction
tend to reside in high-density census tracts. Note that, while this locational tendency is the
one predicted above, the earlier rationale for it is now absent. In other words, since interac-
tion decreases rather than increases with density, interactive individuals sacriﬁce something by
12locating in dense tracts and therefore must have another reason to do so.
Note that, while the positive and signiﬁcant non-IV coeﬃcients in the NEITALK and
FRNDHNG equations would ordinarily be viewed as conﬁrmation of the Putnam hypothesis,
the IV results show that these results are spurious, being the consequence of sorting by in-
dividuals across neighborhoods. In other words, the apparent tendency of interaction-prone
individuals to locate in dense neighborhoods leads to a positive correlation between density and
interaction, as reﬂected in the non-IV estimates. Controlling for this locational endogeneity,
the IV results show that, if a given individual (with a particular unobservable propensity to
interact) were relocated from a dense to a less dense census tract, the level of interaction for
this person would rise, not fall.
Summing up, the results in Table 3 strongly contradict the main hypothesis, showing that
social interaction tends to be weaker, not stronger, in high-density census tracts. While a
positive density eﬀect might make sense given that people living in close proximity should ﬁnd
interaction easier, the data disconﬁrm this logic. Possible reasons for the contrary ﬁndings are
d i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n4 . 5b e l o w .
4.3. Results for group-involvement variables
Group involvement measures another dimension of social interaction, and Table 4 presents
results for the four variables in this set. Panel A of the table shows IVPROBIT results with
NEICOOP as the dependent variable. Note that, because of a large number of missing NE-
ICOOP values, the sample size for this estimation is only 7316. The tract-density variable is
positive but insigniﬁcant, indicating no eﬀect of density on the likelihood of cooperating with
neighbors. But cooperation increases with age, marriage, the presence of children, income,
education, citizenship, long-time residence, and the respondent’s status as a homemaker.13
Interestingly, black respondents are more likely to cooperate with neighbors than non-minority
households, although the Hispanic and Asian coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant. Cooperation tends
to be more likely outside the Paciﬁc region. The Wald test cannot reject exogeneity of tract
density.14
Panel B of Table 4 shows IVPROBIT results with GRPHOB as the dependent variable.
The tract density coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that membership in a hobby-
13oriented club is less likely in a dense census tract. This ﬁnding again contradicts the main
hypothesis. Club membership is higher for males and rises with age, income, education, retire-
ment and citizenship, but falls with marriage and the presence of children.15 The coeﬃcients
of the race and regional variables are now uniformly insigniﬁcant. Exogeneity of tract density
is rejected by the Wald test.16
Panel C shows 2SLS results with CCLUBMET as the dependent variable. The tract-
density coeﬃcient is again negative, indicating that respondents living in dense census tracts
attend relatively few club meetings, again contradicting the main hypothesis. While the eﬀects
of income, education, marriage, the presence of young children, education, retirement, and
citizenship are the same as in panel B, the presence of older children raises the frequency of
club attendance (perhaps a Boy Scout eﬀect). In addition, males attend fewer meetings, age
and unemployment now have negative impacts, and long-time residence has a positive eﬀect.17
Regional eﬀects remain absent, and the diagnostic tests are satisfactory.
Panel D shows 2SLS results with GPRINVLV as the dependent variable. A negative
coeﬃcient again emerges for tract density, showing that respondents in dense areas belong to
relatively few non-church groups. While the eﬀects of income, education, the presence of older
children, and citizenship remain the same, the results show higher group membership for black
and Hispanic respondents and lower membership for Asians. Given the insigniﬁcant racial
eﬀects for hobby-oriented club membership, this eﬀect is apparently capturing membership
eﬀects for other types of groups. Respondents who are unemployed or are homemakers also
belong to fewer groups, while sex, marriage, young children, and long-time residence have no
eﬀect. Regional eﬀects are again absent, and the diagnostic tests are satisfactory.
Table 4 again shows the tract-density coeﬃcients from non-IV regressions, and they mostly
show the same pattern as in Table 3. In particular, the non-IV GRPHOB, CCLUBMET,
GRPINVLV density coeﬃcients are all insigniﬁcant, while IV estimation leads to coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcantly negative. Although both NEICOOP density coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant,
these other results suggest that IV estimation tends to eliminate an upward bias in the non-IV
coeﬃcients, indicating a positive correlation between tract density and the error term.
Summing up, the estimates provide the same message as the results for the friendship-
14oriented interaction measures. Group involvement tends to be weaker, not stronger, in high-
density census tracts, contradicting the main hypothesis.
4.4. Results for other speciﬁcations
Table 5 shows the estimated tract-density coeﬃcients for two additional speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst column shows the consequences of dropping average MSA density as an instrumental
variable, using urbanized-area density as a single instrument. By comparison with the results
in Tables 3 and 4, it can be seen that, with the exception of the FRIENDS density coeﬃcient,
which is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, the set of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is unaﬀected
by use of the single instrument. In addition, the magnitudes of most density coeﬃcients change
only slightly, although the FRNDHNG and FRNDHOM coeﬃcients show nontrivial changes.
The coeﬃcients for the other covariates, which are not reported, exhibit little change between
the two speciﬁcations.
The second column of Table 5 shows the consequences of dropping PART MAR, HOME-
MAKER and the KIDS variables as covariates, on the grounds of potential endogeneity. While
the coeﬃcient signs remain the same, estimated magnitudes show more-substantial changes
than in column one, and two previously signiﬁcant density coeﬃcients (in the CONFIDE and
FRIENDS equations) now are signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level. However, the previ-
ously insigniﬁcant NEITALK coeﬃcient is now nearly signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The
estimate coeﬃcients for most of the other covariates are not greatly aﬀected by this change in
speciﬁcation.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the main ﬁnding of the paper, density’s negative
eﬀect on interaction, is reasonably robust to these two changes in the speciﬁcation of the model.
In addition to considering these other speciﬁcations, it is useful to compare the present
results to selected ﬁndings from Gottlieb and Glaeser (2006) and Borck (2006). These papers
focus on broad sets of social-capital measures, but a few of their regressions involve social-
interaction measures like the present ones. Using a survey variable indicating whether the
respondent entertains friends at home, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) present a regression showing
that such behavior is less likely in cities than in suburbs. However, this result, which is
consistent with present ﬁndings, disappears in regressions for the period after 1990. Borck’s
15results show that a survey respondent’s number of friends is unaﬀected by city size, while the
level of interaction with friends is greater in large cities. With a positive correlation between
density and city size, this latter result appears to contradict the present ﬁndings.18
4.5. Why is the density eﬀect negative?
The paper’s maintained hypothesis, that social interaction is stronger in denser areas, arose
from the conjecture that high densities facilitate interaction by putting people in close prox-
imity. The results, however, show the opposite eﬀect, and a question is why. One possibility
is that dense environments oﬀer residents more sources of entertainment (museums, theaters,
etc.), lessening the need to interact with others in the pursuit of stimulation.19 Alternatively,
the crowding associated with a dense environment might spur a need for privacy, causing
people to draw inward. Such behavior could reﬂect the old saying: “good fences make good
neighbors.” Another possibility is that high densities may be associated with criminal activity,
making people suspicious of one another and reluctant to interact.
The latter conjecture might be testable by including a crime measure in the interaction
equation along with density. Comprehensive crime data are not available at the census tract
level, but even if they were, the tract crime level must be viewed as endogenous in the same
fashion as density (being the result of household’s locational choice). As a result, evaluating
crime as a root cause of the density eﬀect is not at all straightforward.
Since crime may limit interaction by eroding trust between individuals, an alternative ap-
proach would be to include the survey’s trust variable as a covariate in the regression along
with density (the variable measures the degree of trust that the respondent feels toward oth-
ers). However, this approach is also problematic. The diﬃculty is that trust is endogenous,
presumably being dependent on life experiences such as crime victimization, which in turn
may be a function of density. As a result, trust seems inappropriate as an additional covariate
in an equation explaining interaction.
Given this discussion, it appears that isolating the root cause of the negative density eﬀect
is a diﬃcult task, one that is beyond the scope of the present paper. Indeed, the message
of this paper would be unaﬀected by the results of any such further inquiry. Whatever the
reason, density has been shown to exert a negative inﬂuence on social interaction, undermining
16an important line of attack used by critics of urban sprawl.
5. Conclusion
Various authors, most notably Putnam (2000), have argued that low-density living reduces
social interaction, and this argument has been used to buttress criticisms of urban sprawl. But
urban expansion must involve market failures if it is to be ineﬃcient, and this paper shows that
such a distortion indeed arises if low density depresses social interaction. Then, in appraising
the gains from greater individual consumption of living space, consumers fail to consider re-
duced interaction beneﬁts for their neighbors, which arise through lower neighborhood density.
Space consumption is then too high, and cities are excessively spread out.
The key element in this argument is a positive link between social interaction and neigh-
borhood density, and the paper tests empirically for such a link. The results are unfavorable:
whether the focus is friendship-oriented social interaction or measures of group involvement,
the empirical results show a negative, rather than positive, eﬀect of density on interaction.
The paper’s ﬁndings therefore imply that social-interaction eﬀects cannot be credibly in-
cluded in the panoply of criticisms directed toward urban sprawl. In fact, the results suggest
an opposite line of argument. With a negative eﬀect of density on interaction, individual space
consumption would tend to be too low rather than too high, tending to make cities ineﬃciently
compact, as explained in section 2. Thus, the empirical results suggest that social-interaction
eﬀects may counteract, rather than exacerbate, the well-recognized forces (such as unpriced
traﬃc congestion) that cause cities to overexpand.
17TABLE 1: Variable Definitions
Dependent variables
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum
NEISOC How often respondent talks with or visits immediate neighbors: 1= never, 2=once a year or less, 3 
= several times a year, 4=once a month, 5=several times a month, 6=several times a week, 7=just 
about every day
5.079 1 7
NEITALK = 1 if respondent talks or visits immediate neighbors at least once a week, 0 otherwise 0.538 0 1
CONFIDE Number of people respondent can confide in: 1=nobody, 2=one, 3=two, 4=three or more 3.551 1 4
FRIENDS Number of close friends respondent has: 1=none, 2=one or two, 3=three to five, 4=six to ten, 
5=more than ten
3.326 1 5
FRNDHNG Number of times per year respondent hangs out with friends in a public place 16.767 0 60
FRNDHOM Number of times per year respondent visits with friends at home 22.049 0 60
NEICOOP  = 1 if respondent has worked with neighbors to get something fixed or improved 0.315 0 1
GRPHOB  = 1 if respondent participates in a hobby, investment or garden club 0.261 0 1
CCLUBMET Number of times per year respondent attends club meetings 6.008 0 53
GRPINVLV Number of types of non-religious organizations to which respondent belongs 3.158 0 18
Socioeconomic characteristics of respondent
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum
MALE  = 1 if respondent is male, 0 otherwise 0.411 0 1
AGE Respondent's age in years 44.584 18 99
AGE2 AGE squared
PART_MAR  = 1 if respondent is married or living with partner, 0 otherwise 0.569 0 1
KIDS6 Number of children in household under six years old 0.258 0 14
KID6_17 Number of children in household between six and seventeen 0.475 0 8
INC2 = 1 if   $20k < annual household income < $30k 0.148 0 1
INC3 = 1 if   $30k < annual household income < $50k 0.257 0 1
INC4 = 1 if  $50k  < annual household income < $75k 0.201 0 1
INC5 = 1 if  $75k  < annual household income < $100k 0.114 0 1
INC6 = 1 if annual household income > $100k 0.126 0 1
EDSMCOLL = 1 if respondent has completed some college education, 0 otherwise 0.327 0 1
EDCOLLGD = 1 if respondent has a college degree, 0 otherwise 0.362 0 1
RACBLACK = 1 if respondent is black, 0 otherwise 0.147 0 1
RACHISPN = 1 if respondent is Hispanic, 0 otherwise 0.088 0 1
RACASIAN = 1 if respondent is Asian, 0 otherwise 0.028 0 1
UNEMP = 1 if respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise 0.044 0 1
HOMEMAK = 1 if respondent is a home-maker, 0 otherwise 0.059 0 1
RETIRED = 1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise 0.161 0 1
CITIZ = 1 if respondent is a US citizen, 0 otherwise 0.949 0 1
LIVG5 = 1 if respondent has lived in his/her community for more than five years, 0 otherwise 0.084 0 1Population density measures
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum
LNPDEN_TRACT Census tract density: people per square mile  8.008 1.529 12.258
LNPDEN_UA Urbanized Area density: people per square mile 7.845 6.747 8.863
LNPDEN_P_MSA MSA density: people per square mile 6.188 3.281 7.615
Regional controls. Omitted category: Pacific
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum
NEWENGL  =1 if census region is New England, 0 otherwise 0.066 0 1
MIDATLAN  =1 if census region is Mid Atlantic, 0 otherwise 0.096 0 1
EANOCENT  =1 if census region is East North Central, 0 otherwise 0.247 0 1
WENOCENT  =1 if census region is West North Central, 0 otherwise 0.060 0 1
SOUTHATL  =1 if census region is South Atlantic, 0 otherwise 0.206 0 1
EASOCENT  =1 if census region is East South Central, 0 otherwise 0.044 0 1
WESOCENT  =1 if census region is West South Central, 0 otherwise 0.030 0 1




































Number of clusters (Urbanized Areas) = 308
R-squared = 0.379 F(31,307) = 43.04TABLE 3: Friendship-Oriented Variables
Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
LNPDEN_TRACT -0.081 -2.51 -0.024 -1.48 -0.020 -2.14 -0.027 -2.37 -0.419 -1.36 -1.086 -3.38
MALE 0.054 1.61 0.027 1.13 -0.102 -9.50 0.060 3.27 -2.358 -7.79 0.111 0.36
AGE 0.024 3.35 0.010 2.10 -0.009 -3.80 -0.023 -6.41 -1.400 -21.73 -1.243 -20.76
AGE2 0.000 -1.13 0.000 -0.07 0.000 3.17 0.000 6.53 0.010 15.12 0.009 13.63
PART_MAR 0.098 2.75 0.075 2.92 -0.023 -1.91 -0.044 -2.62 -5.299 -15.39 -2.035 -5.44
KIDS6 0.129 5.68 0.100 5.07 -0.036 -3.81 -0.055 -3.47 -1.649 -5.91 -0.971 -4.67
KID6_17 0.075 3.59 0.053 4.09 -0.026 -3.46 -0.048 -4.81 -0.907 -5.33 -0.280 -1.04
INC2 0.023 0.36 -0.035 -1.13 0.106 3.84 0.131 3.97 1.218 2.24 1.129 1.78
INC3 0.207 3.72 0.025 0.66 0.173 6.24 0.213 6.68 2.500 5.08 1.877 3.20
INC4 0.241 3.70 0.010 0.30 0.206 7.19 0.256 7.84 3.440 5.91 2.602 3.87
INC5 0.257 3.55 0.011 0.23 0.219 8.10 0.271 7.58 4.404 6.23 2.591 3.10
INC6 0.280 3.62 0.034 0.63 0.272 8.48 0.414 11.18 5.694 8.55 5.049 7.07
EDSMCOLL 0.120 3.04 0.065 2.85 0.149 9.46 0.115 4.91 1.699 4.75 1.044 2.36
EDCOLLGD 0.072 1.63 -0.033 -1.10 0.217 14.41 0.219 7.79 1.119 2.23 -0.402 -0.85
RACBLACK -0.383 -7.05 -0.145 -4.12 -0.190 -8.81 -0.386 -12.74 -2.044 -4.69 -2.783 -5.62
RACHISPN -0.467 -6.37 -0.195 -3.83 -0.294 -11.31 -0.198 -5.32 -1.285 -1.91 -3.725 -5.63
RACASIAN -0.290 -3.11 -0.159 -2.94 -0.161 -3.71 -0.159 -3.73 -2.280 -3.56 -2.740 -2.90
UNEMP -0.089 -1.03 -0.050 -1.07 -0.056 -2.08 -0.078 -2.14 -0.311 -0.35 0.486 0.60
HOMEMAK 0.116 1.49 0.085 1.42 0.009 0.36 0.012 0.30 0.407 0.63 0.129 0.21
RETIRED 0.146 2.24 0.110 2.47 0.016 0.48 0.120 3.42 1.463 2.09 1.773 2.62
CITIZ 0.475 6.11 0.310 5.72 0.121 2.93 0.036 0.92 1.437 1.85 4.202 6.28
LIVG5 0.087 1.47 0.028 0.74 -0.015 -0.77 0.095 3.27 1.183 2.13 1.886 3.17
NEWENGL -0.181 -1.59 -0.091 -1.27 -0.010 -0.61 -0.096 -3.95 -0.335 -0.54 0.351 0.42
MIDATLAN -0.050 -0.63 0.015 0.30 -0.096 -5.74 -0.108 -3.65 -1.165 -1.97 -1.355 -1.48
EANOCENT 0.019 0.35 0.012 0.32 -0.045 -2.93 -0.006 -0.23 -0.107 -0.21 -1.556 -2.83
WENOCENT 0.180 3.23 0.126 4.47 -0.008 -0.36 0.066 2.59 1.668 2.55 0.166 0.36
SOUTHATL -0.087 -1.33 -0.022 -0.53 -0.123 -6.05 -0.076 -2.55 -2.294 -3.22 -3.095 -5.61
EASOCENT -0.120 -1.37 -0.058 -1.04 -0.169 -5.23 -0.046 -1.26 -1.364 -1.78 -3.067 -3.30
WESOCENT 0.187 2.84 0.078 1.73 -0.129 -5.46 -0.004 -0.08 -0.311 -0.52 0.609 0.93
MOUNTN 0.097 0.99 0.017 0.45 -0.008 -0.34 0.015 0.32 0.784 1.12 1.039 1.75
CONSTANT 4.112 11.43 -0.532 -2.64 3.708 34.76 3.736 28.40 60.422 18.01 62.561 19.46
OLS or Probit Coeff, z 0.005 0.31 0.019 1.96 -0.006 -1.46 -0.006 -1.03 0.334 2.67 0.029 0.20
LPDEN_TRACT               




(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)N 14755 14755 14804 14810 14806 14802
Number of clusters 306 306 308 307 308 308
F (d.f.) 88.42 (30, 305) 115.150 (30, 307) 71.99  (30, 306) 150.840 (30, 307) 206.180 (30, 307)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald Chi-sq (30)        --- 1707.010       ---       ---       ---       ---
P-value 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 0.017       --- 0.544 1.979 4.591 7.040
Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.897 0.461 0.160 0.032 0.008
Endogeneity test of 7.256 9.400 2.896 3.629 3.383 7.019
endog. regressors
Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.007 0.002 0.089 0.057 0.066 0.008
NEISOC NEITALK CONFIDE FRIENDS FRNDHNG FRNDHOMTABLE 4: Group-Involvement Variables
Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
LNPDEN_TRACT 0.031 1.50 -0.047 -2.91 -0.478 -2.30 -0.099 -2.05
MALE 0.038 1.04 0.135 5.29 -0.638 -2.98 0.033 0.63
AGE 0.026 4.70 0.010 2.57 -0.217 -6.33 0.025 2.74
AGE2 0.000 -3.17 0.000 -2.26 0.002 5.59 0.000 -0.46
PART_MAR 0.070 2.44 -0.082 -3.75 -0.885 -4.64 -0.063 -1.57
KIDS6 0.022 0.88 -0.082 -4.27 -0.486 -4.01 -0.031 -1.38
KID6_17 0.083 4.52 -0.021 -1.29 0.539 3.90 0.300 11.92
INC2 -0.020 -0.37 0.016 0.37 0.499 1.87 0.254 3.58
INC3 0.058 1.04 0.171 3.98 1.059 3.60 0.591 7.94
INC4 0.182 3.87 0.241 6.07 1.689 5.81 0.811 12.99
INC5 0.257 3.82 0.309 5.56 1.331 3.98 0.978 10.15
INC6 0.295 4.38 0.367 7.29 2.979 7.89 1.418 14.84
EDSMCOLL 0.184 5.76 0.279 10.54 2.214 8.25 0.897 17.21
EDCOLLGD 0.191 5.27 0.404 12.31 3.748 13.48 1.693 27.88
RACBLACK 0.149 3.10 0.015 0.35 0.145 0.36 0.810 8.26
RACHISPN 0.040 0.75 -0.029 -0.49 -0.569 -1.50 0.231 2.09
RACASIAN -0.079 -0.61 -0.058 -0.91 -1.278 -1.92 -0.246 -1.98
UNEMP -0.122 -1.65 -0.101 -1.84 -0.876 -2.30 -0.256 -3.10
HOMEMAK 0.114 1.94 0.039 0.76 0.253 0.58 -0.335 -3.83
RETIRED -0.015 -0.24 0.161 3.49 0.860 2.23 -0.086 -0.82
CITIZ 0.307 2.79 0.142 2.38 2.180 7.91 0.662 9.26
LIVG5 0.112 1.93 0.010 0.25 0.965 2.37 0.080 1.06
NEWENGL 0.131 3.52 -0.065 -1.26 -0.544 -1.37 -0.127 -1.18
MIDATLAN -0.048 -1.20 -0.047 -0.94 -0.691 -1.46 -0.108 -0.81
EANOCENT 0.020 0.31 -0.011 -0.24 -0.041 -0.10 0.132 1.21
WENOCENT 0.127 3.34 -0.032 -0.53 0.363 0.85 0.081 0.61
SOUTHATL 0.107 2.35 -0.059 -1.13 -0.323 -0.61 0.045 0.34
EASOCENT 0.102 0.85 -0.075 -1.23 -0.806 -1.50 0.076 0.59
WESOCENT 0.160 2.31 -0.010 -0.16 0.547 1.01 0.000 0.00
MOUNTN 0.102 2.03 0.006 0.10 0.264 0.47 0.086 0.64
CONSTANT -2.195 -9.05 -1.026 -5.56 10.209 5.21 0.548 1.08
OLS or Probit Coeff, z 0.011 0.87 -0.005 -0.65 -0.036 -0.37 0.012 0.67
LPDEN_TRACT
N 7316 14813 14794 14827
Number of clusters 242 308 308 308
F (d.f.)       ---       --- 40.000  (30,307) 179.360   (30, 307)
P-value 0.000 0.000
 
Wald Chi-sq ( 30)  753.610 907.760       ---       ---
P-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic       ---       --- 0.049 0.026
Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.825 0.872
Endogeneity test of 0.710 6.990 3.624 4.815
endog. regressors
Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.399 0.008 0.057 0.028
(IVPROBIT) (IVPROBIT) (2SLS) (2SLS)
ABCD
NEICOOP GRPHOB CCLUBMET GRPINVLVTable 5: LPDEN_TRACT Coefficient in Other Specifications
Single Instrument w/o PART_MAR,
KIDS,HOMEMAKER
Coeff z Coeff z
NEISOC -0.079 -2.03 -0.095 -2.82
NEITALK -0.017 -0.66 -0.032 -1.93
CONFIDE -0.023 -2.07 -0.014 -1.60
FRIENDS -0.028 -1.82 -0.018 -1.61
FRNDHNG -0.150 -0.39 -0.005 -0.02
FRNDHOM -0.717 -1.97 -0.912 -2.87
NEICOOP 0.029 1.05 0.023 1.11
GRPHOB -0.055 -2.35 -0.360 -2.27
CCLUBMET -0.459 -2.02 -0.440 -2.09
GRPINVLV -0.117 -1.96 -0.110 -2.24References
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18Footnotes
∗We thank Rainald Borck, Ami Glazer, David Neumark, Stuart Rosenthal and Ken Small for
helpful comments. They are not responsible, however, for any shortcomings in the paper.
1For a good overview of these arguments, see the 12-article symposium published in the Fall
1998 issue of the Brookings Review.
2A properly-set UGB is equivalent to a tax in dealing with the ﬁrst failure. However, Brueck-
ner (2006) shows that a UGB is a poor second-best instrument for dealing with unpriced
road congestion.
3See Powdthavee (2005) for evidence showing that friendships increase happiness.
4A potential connection between urban sprawl and obesity, which is thought to arise from
high auto usage and thus low exercise in sprawling cities, has been the focus of a number
of recent papers (see Ewing et al. (2003) and Lopez (2004)). However, even if low-density
living contributes to obesity, there appears to be no externality involved and thus no basis
for claiming that the eﬀect contributes to an ineﬃcient spatial expansion of cities.
5In providing sensitivity analysis in his regressions relating social capital to city size, Borck
(2006) presents IV results that treat city size as endogenous. His instrument is lagged city
size.
6Interaction may have social value as well as generating private beneﬁts. For example, inter-
action may insure the beneﬁcial spread of information or foster socially responsible behavior.
In this case, the average level of interaction in the city could enter individual i’s utility func-
tion along with Ii. However, since interaction is constant across people under the above
assumptions, this modiﬁcation would have no eﬀect on the model.
7In Fujita’s model, the density eﬀect arises from the negative environmental impact of crowd-
ing.
8Since the equation predicting tract density is estimated jointly with the interaction equation
in the maximum likelihood IVPROBIT routine, the coeﬃcients and standard errors diﬀer
slightly from those in Table 2.
9To test for validity of the instruments, the probit equation was reestimated as a linear
19probability model using 2SLS. The J-test failed to reject the overidentifying restrictions.
10The age eﬀect turns positive beyond the quadratic minimum at 44 years.
11The age eﬀect turns positive beyond 69 years.
12The age eﬀect turns positive beyond 69 years.
13The age eﬀect turns negative beyond 67 years.
14In a 2SLS linear probability model, the J-test did not reject the overidentifying restrictions.
15The age eﬀect turns negative beyond 51 years.
16In a 2SLS linear probability model, the J-test did not reject the overidentifying restrictions.
17The age eﬀect turns positive beyond 53 years.
18Glaeser and Gottlieb’s study relies on the DDB Needham Life Style Survey, while Borck’s
uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel.
19Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) present results showing how participation in various outside
entertainment activities is greater in central cities than in suburbs.
20